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Few have, up to now, cared about the provenance of artworks;
that an auctioneer, an art dealer or a curator often does not know
whether a painting is purloined; that there is no database available where a researcher can find this information and, most important, there is no law that forces a seller to search and find out
whether an artwork was looted by the Nazis or even stolen.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The humanity lost during World War II can never be restored, nor can human lives be compared in any respect to
t J.D., University of Maine School of Law; Associate, White & Case, New
York. The Author would like to thank Owen Pell, litigation partner at White &
Case in New York, for inspiring this research, and Professor Martin A. Rogoff,
Professor of Law at the University of Maine School of Law, for his guidance and
suggestions. The Author, of course, is solely responsible for any oversights or

errors.
1 Hector Feliciano, Opinion, Confront the Past, Search for Provenance, L.A.

TIMEs, March 15, 1998, at M2.
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losses of material value. Nevertheless, the return of Nazilooted artwork to its rightful owners represents an important
link in the chain of society's processing the atrocities committed
during the war. By restoring property to its rightful owner, we
are recognizing fundamental rights - both political rights and
property rights - and thereby enriching democracy. Only
through this recognition can we now honor the lost humanity of
World War II.
The Nazi regime indiscriminately stole and looted items of
value from Jewish people. They looted Jewish 2 property in the
occupied countries of Europe, stealing, among other things, art
collections, real estate, bank accounts, and antiques. 3 In particular, Hitler went to great lengths to amass what he believed
would be the world's greatest collection of art. 4 Although the
exact number of stolen artworks is unknown, estimates set the
value of the artwork at upwards of hundreds of millions of
dollars. 5
Hitler targeted France because at the time it was the
"center of the art world."6 Consequently, France suffered the
greatest amount of Nazi looting.7 The Nazis looted over twohundred art collections in France, warehousing the works in a
2 During World War II many ethnic groups suffered under the Nazi regime,
however, European Jewry was specifically and methodically targeted for immediate segregation and ultimate liquidation. Accordingly, they lost an incomparable
amount of artwork to calculated Nazi plundering. See Naphtali Lau-Lavie, In Pursuit of Justice:Recovering Looted Assets of European Jewry, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
583 (1998) (estimating Jewish property losses at over $200 billion). Thus, this Author solely addresses the artwork stolen or looted from the Jewish population.
3 See id. Although the Nazi regime was the driving force behind the looting,
members of the civil population in Nazi-occupied countries also participated in the
looting. For example, members of the civil population would wait for the Jewish
victims to be removed from the ghettos and would then flood the temporary Jewish
homes for articles of value. See id. Indeed, "[tihe prevailing mood was an opportunity of enrichment at the expense of neighbors who were destined to become victims of the Nazi destruction machine." Id.
4 See Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call for a New Attitude Toward Artwork Stolen DuringWorld War 11, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc PROBS. 1 (1998).
5 See id. at 2.
6 Id. at 67. Many countries suffered cultural property losses at the hands of
the Nazis. See generally THE SPO"S OF WAR 46-98 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997)
(reviewing the pillage in Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the Former
Soviet Republics, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, and
Germany).
7 See Hector Feliciano et al., Nazi Stolen Art, 20 WHITT. L. REV. 67, 67 (1998).
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secret museum called the Jeu de Paume.8 At the time, the collection consisted of approximately one-third of the world's privately owned artwork. 9
The Nazis were systematic in their plundering. 10 They
went to great lengths to record and compose an inventory of the
works.1" The leaders of the Nazi regime would then view the
collections and would lay claim to the works based on a priority
system. 12 Hitler had first choice; Goering would then choose
whatever works he preferred, and so on down through the Nazi
3
hierarchy.'
As a result of the Nazi looting, thousands of works of art
have found their way now to museums, art dealers, and private
collectors.' 4 Concern over the reclamation of Jewish property
looted during World War II is mounting at the present time particularly because the generation that lived through the war is
disappearing and artwork is beginning to surface through dis5
positions by heirs.'
One of the reasons for the great number of looted works of
art from the war period is that artwork is cumbersome, and
Holocaust victims were unable to carry it with them when relocated. 16 Likewise, victims experienced great difficulty in trying
to quickly value and sell their works.' 7 Thus, victims were
forced to abandon their collections.
Artwork is a unique commodity. It is easily identifiable,
and thus, subsequent purchasers may initially succeed in concealing stolen artwork for some time. Eventually, though, with
a good faith purchaser, the artwork is likely to resurface. ' 8 This
8 See id. at 68.
9 See id.
10 See generally Jonathan Petropoulos, German Laws and Directives Bearing
on the Appropriation of Cultural Property in the Third Reich, in THE SPOILS OF
WAR, supra note 6, at 106-11 (providing a thorough discussion of the Nazi plan to
appropriate artwork from Jews and other minority groups).
11 See Feliciano, supra note 7, at 68.
12 See id. at 70-71.
13 See id. at 71.
14 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2.
15 See Feliciano, supra note 7, at 73.
16 See id. at 72.
17 See id.
18 See Owen C. Pell, The Potentialfor a Mediation/ArbitrationCommission to
Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War II, 10
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 27 (1999).

3

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 12:367

resurfacing often gives rise to claims to the work and disputes
over its ownership. 19 Furthermore, artwork carries with it
great sentimental value, and it is therefore, "the type of asset
20
Holocaust victims might have tried hardest to retain." Similarly, sentiment is often the driving force behind Jewish survivors and families of World War II victims seeking to reclaim
21
their artwork that was looted or stolen during the war.
This article considers the different alternatives that individuals may pursue in attempting to reclaim Nazi-looted artwork. First, post-war restitution efforts are discussed. Next,
recent innovations in data compilation systems are reviewed
and applauded as a step in the right direction. Recent litigation
attempts by parties in the United States court system are then
briefly discussed and the alternative of litigation is highly criticized because of its national focus and the varied nature of standards now imposed by different courts. Then, the Author
explores the existing international treaties that, to some extent,
address the return of cultural property. After concluding that
the existing alternatives are insufficient mechanisms for claimants to pursue, the Author suggests that the existing treaties
provide a basis for recognizing a general obligation of states to
negotiate, at the minimum, an international solution for art restitution. Finally, the Author recommends establishing a special
tribunal to resolve these claims via a treaty that is binding at
the state level.
II.
A.

ALTERNATIvES AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS PURSUING CLAIMS

Post-War Efforts

Post-war efforts of the Allied Control Council to institute a
binding solution for the restitution of World War II survivors or
victims' families ended primarily in failure. Although the Allied
forces initiated many discussions to address cultural restitution, political and logistical complications barred the culmination of a successful solution. 22 In terms of political differences
among the Allied forces, the smaller nations, especially
19 See id.
20 Feliciano, supra note 7, at 72.
21

See id.

22 See Michael J. Kurtz, The End of the War and the Occupation of Germany,

1944-52. Laws and Conventions Enacted to Counter German Appropriations:The
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Belgium, supported the creation of a document that would bind
all the signatories to facilitate cultural restitution. The larger
nations, however, blocked such a threatening solution. The
British, Americans and Soviets resisted binding themselves to
the smaller powers primarily because they were hesitant to diminish any hegemony during post-war negotiations. 23 Efforts
were further stalled because there were greater post-war conflicts to address, and cultural restitution raised many complex
issues, including "the scope of the entire effort, restitution-inkind, returning property to refugees, and the disposition of heir24
less property."
The Allied forces did reach a temporary solution during the
post-war period. Central Collecting Points (hereinafter CCPs)
were set up throughout Germany to catalog and store artwork
until the rightful owners could be found. 25 Ultimately, 3.45 mil26
lion cultural objects were returned as a result of the CCPs.
The program was subsequently transferred in 1949 to the German government where the works of art were placed in the
27
Trust Administration of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Likewise, the United States Department of State established a
28
similar program to facilitate the return of artwork.
Beyond the workings of the CCPs, post-war efforts to facilitate cultural property restitution came to a standstill. Soon, the
Allied parties' political agendas changed in focus, and a binding
solution became hopeless. Cold War tensions began to mount
Allied Control Council, in THE SPOILS OF WAR,supra note 6, at 112-16 (Elizabeth

Simpson ed., 1997).
23 See id. at 112-13.
24 Id. at 113.
25 See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 1987).
26 See Kurtz, supra note 22, at 116. Complimenting the CCPs was a unit created to investigate Nazi activity and specifically the Nazi practices of looting artwork. See James S. Plaut, Investigation of the Major Nazi Art-Confiscation
Agencies, in THE SPOILS OF WAR,supra note 6, at 124-25. In 1944, the Allied forces
formed the Art Looting Investigation Unit of the Office of Strategic Services. See
id. at 124. The purpose of the Unit was (1) "to provide information helpful in the
art-restitution process; and (2) to provide evidence for the prosecution of Nazi leaders at the Nuremberg trials." Id. Members of the Unit miraculously recovered a
Nazi-generated inventory of cultural items taken from Belgium, France, Italy and
the Netherlands. The inventory included information about the artworks' provenance, the condition of the artwork and, most important, the works' whereabouts.
See id. at 125.
27 See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111.
28 See id.
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and the Americans decided to discontinue returning stolen cultural property to the artwork's country of origin. 29 According to
one scholar, this American trend "symbolized the final failure of
30
Allied diplomacy in the arena of cultural restitution."
B. Recent Innovations Regarding the Disseminationof
Provenance
In response to the recent resurfacing of artwork that disappeared during World War II, innovations serving to help victims
and their families pursue claims have emerged. Specifically,
the international art community has witnessed a sea of change
in the transfer of information on artwork. Previously, artists,
dealers, collectors, and museums had an incentive to conceal an
artwork's provenance. 3 1 That is, "each participant in the illicit
antiquities market ha[d] an incentive to strip as much information as possible from an artifact before it enters the safe ano32
nymity of the legitimate art market."
The legitimization of the illicit art market hinges directly
on the dissemination of information regarding an artwork's
provenance, 33 and the Internet has offered a valuable forum for
the transmission of art information. 34 For example, the Art
Loss Register contains "an international, permanent, computer29 See Kurtz, supra note 22, at 116. The Americans also honored individual
foreign citizens' requests for the restitution of cultural property. See id.
30 Id.
31 See Randy Gidseg et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 36 AM. CRiM.L. REV.
935, 867-69 (1999).
32 Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 410-11 (1995).
33 See Pell, supra note 18, at 51-54.
34 See, e.g., Stephen K. Urice, World War 11 and the Movement of Cultural
Property: an Introduction and Brief Bibliography for the Museum Administrator,
Legal Problems of Museum Administration, AL-ABA Course of Study Materials,
March 26, 1998; The Art Loss Register, at http'//www.artloss.com// (visited Nov. 11,
1999) [hereinafter Art Loss Register];Getty Information Institute, The Work of the
Getty ProvenanceInstitute,at http://www.getty.edu (visited Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Getty Institute]. The following organizations have participated in the Getty
Information Institute: the Bibliothoque et Archives des Mus6es Nationaux au
Musie du Louvre, Paris; CERCAM, Universith Michel de Montaigne, Bordeaux;
Fondazione San Paolo, Turin; Frick Art Reference Library, New York; Gemeentearchief, Amsterdam; Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg; Kunsthalle, Hamburg;
The Mellon Centre, London; Mus6es Royaux des Beaux-Arts de Belgique, Brussels;
the National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C.; and Rijksbureau voor Kunsthistoriche Documentatie, The Hague. See id.
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ized clearinghouse on stolen and missing art."3 5 The Art Loss
Register maintains a database consisting of over 60,000 items
and has been helpful in the recovery of many stolen cultural
objects via its general circulation of art information. 3 6 The web
site for the Art Loss Register provides a free service where a
victim can register a missing item on a central database, have
the service check the artwork daily against the catalogues of
auction houses, and obtain assistance in researching a work of
art.3 7

In addition, the Getty Information Institute in Los Angeles
maintains the Getty Provenance Index. 38 The Index contains
information on the provenance of approximately a half-million
works of art, including such information as the artwork's various owners, its history of auction transfers, and the current location of the work of art.3 9 Finally, a high-technology firm in
San Francisco has created a digital registration process called
ISIS (Intrinsic Signature Identification System) which is "based
on the premise that all objects contain unique microscopic physical features and random anomalies that cannot be duplicated." 40 The process may help resolve disputes regarding the
authenticity and provenance of artwork, and deter against fu41
ture art theft.
This trend is encouraging, and it serves to promote an international forum for the transfer of provenance. Yet, none of
these registries or services has been recognized internationally,
either via a treaty or through custom, as the definitive central
art registry. 4 2 Furthermore, these efforts do not represent a
comprehensive legal solution to the return of Nazi-looted artwork. They would certainly enhance a more binding international solution to widely resolve claims disputes and therefore,
cannot be disregarded.
35 Gidseg, supra note 31, at 868 n. 251; see also The Art Loss Register, supra
note 34.
36 See The Art Loss Register, supra note 34.
37 See id.
38 See Gidseg, supra note 31, at 868 n. 252 (discussing the Getty Information
Institute, The Work of the Getty ProvenanceInstitute, at http://www.gii.getty.eduprovenance/index.html, (visited Nov. 11, 1999)).
39 See Getty Institute, supra, note 34.
40 Gidseg, supra note 31, at 879 n.253.
41 See id.
42 See Feliciano, supra note 7, at 74.
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PrivateLawsuits

The estimated recovery rate for stolen artwork is approximately twelve percent; 43 thus, most artwork is unrecoverable,
or alternatively, extremely expensive to recover. 4 Jewish families who engage in litigation to resolve title disputes can generally expect to be engaged in their claim dispute for seven to
twelve years. 4 5 As a result, the cost of the suit will likely exceed
the value of the artwork, and the prospects that the plaintiff
46
will gain title to the artwork are not promising.
There are a number of hurdles that a claimant must pass to
successfully maintain a suit. A leading specialist in the art law
field summarizes the legal issues typical to a Nazi-looted art
reclamation claim as follows:
(1) how to establish ownership to title; (2) when must a demand
be made and what is the relevant statute of limitations to make it;
(3) what rights, if any, does a bona fide purchaser have in a stolen
or looted work of art; and (4) what claims run against professional
sellers, such as art dealers, who bought and/or sold a stolen or
47
looted work.
The following discussion highlights the legal standards governing ownership claims and focuses solely on litigation outcomes within the United States.
Artwork claim disputes are generally analyzed under the
common law theory of stolen property. 4 Under this theory, a
thief cannot pass title to a buyer, even if the buyer is an innocent or a bona fide purchaser. 4 9 Therefore, in the context of
Holocaust victims, title vests in the original owner, despite the
presence of a long chain of innocent owners. Some courts, however, have clouded this rule, declaring a statute of limitations
43 See Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A ProposedSolution to Disputes Over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 15,
36 (1998).
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
4 Feliciano, supra note 7, at 73.
48 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 4.
49 See id at 3 (citing Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150,
1160 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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period that begins when the innocent purchaser gains posses50
sion of the artwork.
One of the reasons for the disparity in legal standards regarding lost artwork claims within the United States, is the different standards of duty courts have imposed upon a true owner
to recover lost artwork. For example, some courts impose upon
true owners the due diligence standard. 5 1 In other words, to
maintain a suit the true owner must prove that he or she diligently attempted to recover the artwork. 5 2 Alternatively, other
courts have adopted the demand and refusal rule where the
true owner has a limited time period to file suit after he or she
demands the return of the artwork and the possessor of the art53
work refuses to return the artwork.
In one of the first United States cases concerning this issue,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the due diligence
standard in O'Keeffe v. Snyder.54 Although the claim in dispute
in O'Keeffe did not arise in the context of World War II, the
court's decision applies generally to actions in replevin. 55 Pursuant to the due diligence standard set forth in O'Keeffe, the
statute of limitations will begin to run when "the owner knows
or reasonably should know of his cause of action and the identity of the possessor of the chattel." 56 Thus, the burden is
shifted onto the true owner.5 7 At the end of the statutory pe58
riod, title vests in the possessor of the artwork.
Presiding over the jurisdiction containing some of the
world's greatest art collections, the New York federal courts
have struggled with what standards to apply to stolen art cases.
Their line of cases started with DeWeerth v. Baldinger (herein59
DeWeerth I concerned a claim dispute over
after DeWeerth I).
a Claude Monet painting that disappeared from Germany at the
end of World War II at a time when American soldiers were
50 See id at 3.
51 See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478 (1980) (summarily rejecting the doctrine of adverse possession).
52 See id.
53 See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
54 See O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 478.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 497, 502.
57 See id. at 499.
58 See id. at 501.
59 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103.
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quartered in the home of the original owner. 60 Despite the
plaintiffs efforts to recover the painting after the war, the
painting eventually resurfaced in a New York City gallery and
was bought by a good faith purchaser, the defendant. 6 1 The
plaintiff subsequently learned of the painting's whereabouts,
made a demand upon the defendant to return the work, and
within three years of the demand, initiated a lawsuit against
62
the defendant for her refusal to relinquish the painting.
In DeWeerth I, the Second Circuit focused on the requirement that the demand may not be unreasonably delayed. 63 To
avoid an unreasonable delay, the court imposed a due diligence
duty upon the owner to search for the stolen artwork. 64 Thus,
the statute of limitations would begin to run when the owner
could have learned the location of the lost artwork. 65 In conclusion, the court held that the plaintiff had not met the due diligence requirement and had therefore caused an unreasonable
66
delay.
67
Next, in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,
(hereinafter Guggenheim) the Court of Appeals of New York
considered the demand rule in a case concerning a lost Chagall
gouache. 68 The Guggenheim museum lost the gouache sometime in the late 1960s, presumably when an employee of the

museum absconded with

it.69

The defendant, Rachel Lubell,

later purchased the gouache from an art gallery in 1967.70 During preliminary arrangements for an art show in which the defendant was showing the gouache, the Guggenheim learned of
its location and the owner's identity. In 1986, the museum
made a demand upon the defendant to return the gouache to
the museum. The defendant refused to return the gouache and
60 See id. at 104-05.
61 See id. at 105.
62 See id. at 106-07.
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See id. at 107.
See id. at 110.
See DeWerth, 836 F.2d at 108.
See id. at 112.
Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311 (1991).
See id. at 314.
See id.
See id.
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the Guggenheim responded by initiating a legal action against
71
the defendant.
At issue in Guggenheim was whether the museum was
barred by the three year statute of limitations because the museum had not taken any steps to recover the gouache. 72 The
question was whether the museum had caused an unreasonable
delay in attempting to locate the item. 73 The museum argued
that it is common practice for museums to refrain from publicizing thefts. 7 4 The Guggenheim reasoned that museums are generally concerned about the publicity concerning an art theft
because it may ultimately lead to the reporting of gaps in mu75
seum security and force the artwork further underground.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Guggenheim decision, rejecting the O'Keeffe due diligence rule, stating: "it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence requirement that could take into account all of th[e] variables and
that would not unduly burden the true owner."7 6 By so holding,
the court functionally shifted the burden to the potential purchaser, requiring the purchaser to investigate an artwork's
provenance prior to the sale. 7 7 The court reasoned this was the
equitable result because it would be unfair to place the burden
78
of searching for the artwork on the original owner.
After the Guggenheim decision, a district court decided
DeWeerth v. Baldinger (hereinafter DeWeerth II),79 holding that
laches was the only defense that the defendant could raise,
thereby placing the burden back on the plaintiff.8 0 The Second
Circuit then held that the district court had abused its discretion in granting relief judgment.8 ' Ultimately, the Second CirSee
See
73 See
74 See
75 See
71

72

76

Guggenheim, 77 N.Y.2d at 316.
id. at 316-17.
id. at 316-17.
id. at 316.
id. at 320.

Id.

77 See Guggenheim, 77 N.Y.2d at 320.
78 See id.
79 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (hereinafter
DeWeerth II].
80 See id. at 552-53.

81 See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1271 (2d Cir. 1994).

11

378

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 12:367

cuit's due diligence rule appears to stand in New York, 2 despite
the Court of Appeals' decision in Guggenheim.
These cases are just a sampling of the case law concerning
lost artwork ownership disputes and simply illustrate how the
governing legal standards are very much subject to the vagaries
of courts. In general, judicial systems have been criticized as
being ineffective mechanisms to help Jewish families recover
stolen artwork.8 3 In addition to the time commitment and exorbitant costs of pursuing a claim in a national court, the legal
standards are in no way uniform. Furthermore, in many cases,
assertions of ownership implicate more than one country, leaving great disputes as to what law should govern.
D. InternationalSupport for the Return of Nazi-Looted
Artwork
The following discussion reviews the international treaties
entered into from 1910 to the present.8 4 The United Nations
has been the driving force in drafting these treaties and offering
them for adoption. The following discussion introduces these
treaties and their relevant provisions. The Author then identifies the limitations of these treaties in respect to Jewish claims
and ultimately suggests that the inefficacy of these treaties in
their applicability to Jewish claims can be attributed to a lack of
acceptance of the specific World War II restitution principles
pursuant to international law.
The first treaty protecting cultural property during war
times was signed at the Hague in 1910.85 The Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land explicitly prohibits the "destruction or willful damage" to historic
82 See generally Guggenheim, 77 N.Y.2d at 311.

See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2.
84 See Lawrence M. Kaye, Laws in Force at the Dawn of World War II: International Convention and National Laws, in THE SPOILS OF WAR,supra note 6, at
100-05 (discussing pre-nineteenth century international efforts to preserve cultural property, including the 1815 Convention of Paris, and the Lieber Code of
1863). These early efforts resulted in forty states adopting the Hague Convention
at the turn of the century. See id. at 102. At the conclusion of World War II, the
Hague Convention was the only ratified treaty addressing cultural restitution. See
id.
85 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Jan. 6,
1910, 36 Stat. 2277, art. 27 at 2303 [hereinafter 1910 Convention].
83
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monuments and works of art.8 6 The 1910 Convention, however,
failed to protect cultural property during World War I and was
an even greater failure during World War II.87
In addition to these shortcomings, the 1910 Convention is
further limited in application because it applies only to destruction caused by military action.88 Thus, it appears to bind particular actions of a state as opposed to actions of private citizens
or public depositories of cultural property, leaving individual
parties recourse only through their home governments. The application of the treaty is limited, furthermore, to action taken
during a war, and excludes the post-war period. 9 For these two
reasons, the 1910 Convention is of little utility to post-war restitution efforts.
In 1952, members of the Council of Europe signed into force
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 90 Protocol I of this convention protects general principles of human rights, such as the right to own and
enjoy property. 9 ' Protocol I certainly renders support to Jewish
families seeking the return of their artwork but is quite general
in scope. 92
As a response, in part, to the atrocities of World War II,
contracting parties signed into force the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict in
1954. 93 The 1954 Convention generally recognizes that "cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world,
and that it is important that this heritage should receive international protection." 94 Pursuant to the 1954 Convention, a
country's cultural property includes works of art.9 5 The 1954

Convention further provides that the contracting parties "un86

Id.

See Kaye, supra note 84, at 100-05.
88 See generally 1910 Convention, supra note 85.
89 See generally id.
90 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
91 See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
92 See id.
93 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
94 Id. at preamble.
95 See id. at 242, art. 1.
87
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dertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any
form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of . . . cultural
96
property."
The 1954 Convention has been criticized as falling short in
that it does not address the issue of restitution. 9 7 The Protocol
to the 1954 Convention does provide, however, that contracting
parties will undertake to return cultural property at the end of
the hostilities. 98 Furthermore, the Second Protocol to the 1954
Convention provides that "[plarties shall afford one another the
greatest measure of assistance in connection with investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings" brought pursuant
to an offense committed under the convention, including the obtaining of evidence necessary for the proceedings. 99
The Second Protocol also contains applicable law provisions. That is, the parties bound by the 1954 Convention are
obligated to assist each other in legal proceedings "in conformity with any treaties or other obligations on mutual legal assistance that may exist between them." 10 0 In the absence of such
treaties or arrangements, the Second Protocol provides that the
contracting parties "shall afford one another assistance in accordance with their domestic law."1 0 1
Although the 1954 Convention goes one step further than
the 1952 Convention by specifically rendering protection to artwork in the event of armed conflict, it does not present a comprehensive international solution for the return of Jewish
artwork. Its provisions have not been greatly relied upon, most
likely because the 1954 Convention does not recognize a private
right of action for parties seeking to reclaim cultural property. 10 2 In addition, even though the 1954 Convention's Second
Protocol mandates that parties shall assist each other with legal proceedings, it does not specifically indicate how the parties
96 Id. at 244, art. 4.
97 See Steven Costello, Must Russia Return the Artwork Stolen from Germany
During World War If? 4 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMip. L. 141, 145 (1997).

98 See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
99 Id. at art. 19 (discussing mutual legal assistance).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, supra note 98, at 215.
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will render such assistance. 10 3 Finally, its applicable law provisions present an opportunity for the disparity of treatment of
ownership claims, depending on the whims of judges interpret10 4
ing domestic laws.
Next, in 1970 the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) created the Convention
for Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. 0 5 The 1970 Convention more specifically addresses the situation of Jewish artwork stolen during World War II in that it prohibits "the import
of cultural property stolen from a museum."' 0 6 Cultural propof
erty, as defined by the 1970 Convention, includes "property
10 7
medium.
of
number
a
in
works
including
interest,"
artistic
The 1970 Convention further provides that the member
country shall "take appropriate steps to recover and return" cultural property, provided that "an innocent purchaser" or "a person who has valid title" to the cultural property receives just
compensation.108 This convention imposes on member states
the obligation to ensure the "earliest possible restitution of illicitly exported cultural property to its rightful owner." 0 9 Member states are also obligated under the 1970 Convention to
"admit actions for recovery of lost or stolen items of cultural
property brought or on behalf of the rightful owners.""10
An innovation of the 1970 Convention centers around the
registration of artwork. That is, the 1970 Convention imposes
certain obligations on the member states to maintain information systems about artwork."' Pursuant to Article 5, member
states are obliged to establish "national services" for the protection of cultural heritage." 2 The national service is charged
with drafting laws and regulations regarding the prevention of
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 Convention for Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 10
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter 1970 Convention].
106 Id. at art. 7.
107

Id. at art. 1.

108 Id.
109 Id. at art. 13.

110 Id.
111 See 1970 Convention, supra note 105, at art. 5.
112

Id.
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illicit export of cultural property, and, more significantly, establishing and maintaining a national inventory of protected property. 1 13 The aim of the inventory is to identify those cultural
objects "whose export would constitute an appreciable impover114
ishment of the national cultural heritage."
Next, the 1970 Convention requires antique dealers to
maintain a register recording the origin of the cultural property, the names and addresses of the suppliers, and a description and price of each item the dealer sells. 1 15 Also, the dealer
is required to inform purchasers of cultural property of the 1970
1 6
Convention's export prohibitions.
Although the 1970 Convention seeks the return of cultural
property, it also is not specific enough to address ownership
claims concerning artwork looted during World War II. Rather,
the 1970 Convention is a broad remedial measure, with an aim
at preserving a member state's cultural heritage. Jewish artwork stolen during World War 11 may qualify as cultural property; yet the 1970 Convention is too broad to handle the unique
title disputes raised by Jewish claimants. In addition, even
though the 1970 Convention establishes a registry, its registry's
aim is to identify cultural objects worthy of the convention's
protections. A registry maintaining information specific to
Nazi-looted artwork would more effectively help to resolve title
disputes.
Most recently, in 1995, the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects was adopted. 1 7 The
Preamble to the 1995 Convention provides that the treaty "is
intended to facilitate the restitution and return of cultural objects."'1 Article 3 requires a possessor of a stolen cultural item
to return it.119 Claims may be brought in the contracting state
See id.
Id.
115 See id. at art. 10.
116 See id.
117 UNIDROIT Convention
June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322.
118 Id.
119 See id. at art. 3. A good
rightful owner will be awarded
est in the object. Id. at art. 4.
113
114
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[hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
faith purchaser who returns a cultural object to its
"fair and reasonable compensation" for their inter-
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where the cultural property is located, or another court or tribu120
nal if the parties so agree.
The 1995 Convention goes one step further than previous
treaties in that it sets forth a statute of limitations for when
parties may bring claims. A claimant must bring a claim within
three years of the time when the claimant had knowledge of the
location of the cultural property and the identity of the current
individual in possession of the item, and "in any case within a
period of fifty years from the time of the theft." 12 ' The convention provides, however, that contracting states may limit the
statute of limitations period of specific claims to a seventy-five
year time period.' 2 2 Like the court in O'Keeffe, the 1995 Convention requires the claimant to have exercised due diligence in
12 3
searching for lost cultural property.
The 1995 Convention recognizes the necessity of establishing a registry, but does not contain provisions to provide for a
registry. 2 4 The major shortcoming of the 1995 Convention in
terms of its utility in helping resolve Holocaust claims is that it
does not apply retroactively. Rather, the Convention applies to
claims arising from the date when the convention enters into
force.' 2 5 Article 10(3) explicitly states that claims arising out of
confiscation before the convention are not legitimized and that
parties should take alternative routes to recover such stolen
12 6
cultural property.
These treaties may have shortcomings in terms of their application to Nazi-looted art claims, but they generally provide
support to survivors or victims' families asserting claims. The
question then remains: why is it that these claimants have not
id. at art. 8.
Id. at art. 3.
122 See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 117, at art. 3.
123 See id. at art. 6. The Convention also requires a possessor to exercise due
diligence. Id. at art. 4. A court or tribunal will consider a number of circumstances to determine whether a possessor has successfully met the due diligence
requirement to be a bona fide purchaser including: "the character of the parties,
the price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessible register
of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant information and documentation
which it could reasonably have obtained, and whether the possessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step that a reasonable person would have taken
in the circumstances." Id.; see also O'Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 499 (1980).
124 See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 120, at Preamble.
125 See id. at art. 10.
126 See id. at art. 10(3).
120 See
121
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been successful in pursuing their claims on an international
level? This question can only be answered by analyzing international legal principles and customary law.
III.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although national law is binding on a states' citizens, international law differs in that there is "no universal system for the
compulsory enforcement of international laws." 127 That is,
whether a treaty binds a state depends on the state's voluntary
willingness to recognize and abide by the treaty's terms. 128 On
the other hand, "customary practices reach the status of international law when a large number of the states within the international system suppose these practices establish
1 29
appropriate guidelines for the relations of states."
Also, principles of international law may derive from "established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience."13 0 Thus, customary international
law can aptly be described as "the product of general and consistent practice of states coupled with a sense of legal
3
obligation."' '
In The Concept of Custom in InternationalLaw, 3 2 Anthony
D'Amato critically analyzes 3 3 a framework establishing ele127 Kaye, supra note 84, at 100.
128 See id. See also M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law
Through MunicipalAdjudication:A StructuralInquiry, VA. J. INT'L. L. 829 (2000).
Chibundu argues that "[in the absence of an explicit treaty undertaking... the
most charitable reading of the authority of a national court to assert jurisdiction

over events occurring outside of the national territory is to be based on the quite
fluid notion of 'customary international law.'" Id. at 1121.
129 Craig L. Carr & Gary L. Scott, Multilateral Treaties and the Environment:
A Case Study in the Formation of Customary InternationalLaw, 27 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'y 313, 314 (1999) [hereinafter Scott].

130 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
131 Stephan Wilske, InternationalLaw and the Spoils of War: to the Victor the
Right of Spoils?, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 223, 241-42 (1998).
132 ANTHONY

A. D'AMATo,

THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

104

(1971).

133 The author notes significant shortcomings of the 5 element theory. Although it has these shortcomings, this theory offers a framework for analyzing
custom as a source of international law. See id.
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ments necessary for the "emergence of a principle or rule of cus3
tomary international law:"1 4
(1) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a
type of situation falling within the domain of international
relations;
(2) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable
period of time;
(3) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with,
prevailing international law;
(4) general acquiescence in the practice by other States;
of these elements
(5) the establishment of the 'presence of each
' 135
•. .by a competent international authority.
As the following analysis demonstrates, the concept of art restitution for Nazi-looted art victims and their families has not approached the status of custom according to this framework. The
general concept of cultural restitution, however, is fairly well
embedded in international law as custom.
Certainly, Nazi-looted artwork claims transcend national
borders and likely do not qualify as "purely internal" affairs
that are excluded from the first element.1 36 Whether the practice is concordant and involves a number of States is fairly indeterminable. That is, this particular requirement of element one
is subjective and may depend upon the determination of the
other elements.13 7 In the context of a general obligation for cultural restitution, the conventions discussed in Part II.D evidence a concordant practice by a number of states regarding a
situation that is in the domain of international relations, that
is, cultural restitution at the international level.
Element two is also subjective. Inquiry would focus on
what constitutes "continuation or repetition" and "practice." In
general, "[a] practice becomes customary international law
when states engage in it consistently and out of a sense of obligation." 3 1 In this instance, "practice" has two connotations for
the purpose of this Article. There is the general practice of art
Id. at 7.
Id. (approach derived from Manley Hudson, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B.
L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1).
134

135

136

See id.

137

See id.

INT'L

138 Edward H. Sadtler, A Right to Same-Sex Marriage under International
Law: Can it be Vindicated in the United States?, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 444 (1999).
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preservation and reparations as discussed in Part II.D, and the
specific practice of the return of Nazi-looted artwork.
With regard to the former, recent trends suggest that
states are beginning to recognize the importance of making reparations to World War II victims' families.13 9 Although not recognized in the international arena, the practice of Nazi-looted
art restitution has been in practice in domestic courts for some
time. 140 Using the United States as an example, in terms of
length of practice, the suits date as far back as 1980,141 and
14 2
have been brought consistently up to the recent time period.
In S.S. Lotus, 43 the Permanent Court of International Justice focused on "a general practice of functioning conventions
and domestic court decisions. It investigated the opinions of
publicists, but appropriately set aside the question of whether
such opinions played any role in the establishment of rules of
customary law."1 4 4 Certainly, domestic courts have begun to
entertain Nazi-looted art claim disputes. 14 5 What is missing in
terms of the S.S. Lotus analysis is a functioning convention. On
the other hand, the general obligation imposed on states regarding cultural restitution dates as far back as the turn of the cen46
tury and is well recognized in international treaties.
Temporal requirements in the context of custom have lost some
of their importance. For example, in North Sea Continental
Shelf,147 the International Court of Justice stated that "passage
of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar
to the formation of a new rule of customary international law,"

139 See infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
140 See discussion, infra Part II.C.

See O'Keefe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 487 (1980).
See discussion, infra Part II.C.
143 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Sept. 7)).
144 Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative InternationalLaw, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87, 100 (1991). The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 686-700 (1900) (also involved the United States Supreme Court's
reliance on "a variety of treaties, military orders, and decisions as evidence of practice reflecting a rule of customary international law").
145 See supra Part I. C.
146 See this article, supra note 87 (discussing early efforts).
147 North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4
(Feb. 20).
141

142

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/6

20

20001

TIME FOR A CHANGE?

if the practice is both extensive and virtually uniform. 1 4 Certainly the general obligation of cultural preservation and restitution has withstood the passage of considerable time. The
concept of Nazi-looted art restitution does not rise to the level of
custom as defined in North Sea Continental Shelf, however, because the practice has not approached the level of being "both
1 49
extensive and virtually uniform."
The third element is where the two components critical to
this Author's argument intersect. That is, the general obligation placed on states to provide cultural restitution provides a
basis for an obligation on the states to at least try to negotiate
an international solution to the Nazi-looted art problem. As the
previous discussion highlighted, the practice of cultural restitution is firmly embedded as a customary "practice" in international law. Placing the obligation of Nazi-looted art restitution
on states is certainly well supported by this general principle,
and, pursuant to the third element, consistent with prevailing
international law.
Arthur Weisburd has refined the element of acceptance into
law and he offers the following framework: "(first) the nation
breaching the rule will grant the right of the injured party to
investigate the violation; and (second), that the nation in violation of the rule will acknowledge, at least in principle, a duty to
make reparation for its breach." 50 Reparation is broadly defined, and includes restitution compensation, and a simple ac5
knowledgment of the violation.' '
In the case of Nazi-looted works, the difficulty that claimants face in making trans-national claims suggests that reparations have not become firmly imbedded in international legal
principles. On the other hand, the practice of returning cultural
property as a general category is gaining momentum in the international arena, as evidenced by the 1910 Convention, the

148 Id. at 43 (cited in Chodosh, supra note 144, at 101 (1991)). Mr. Chodosh
explains that North Sea Continental Shelf illustrates a prime example of "instant
customary law." Id. at 101.
149 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 147, at 43.
150 Chodosh, supra note 144 at 103-04 (discussing Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. INT'L L.J. 8, 9 (1988)).
151 See id.
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1952 Protocol I, the 1954 Convention, the 1970 Convention, and
152
the 1995 Convention.
Other states have not come to a general acquiescence in the
practice of returning art on an international level. The recent
Washington Conference evidences a step in the right direction.
Forty-five nations met to discuss and bind themselves to a set of
principles regarding the art restitution for World War II victims
and their families. 153 In addition to the treaties analyzed in
Part II.D, the Washington Conference provided further support
for recognizing an obligation on states to resolve Nazi-looted art
claims at the international level.
Because there is no treaty encompassing the first four elements in the context of Nazi-looted art, the fifth element fails.
The treaties discussed in Part II.D, however, illustrate that the
fifth element has been met in the context of a general obligation
of states to recognize cultural restitution. Thus, establishing a
special tribunal pursuant to a specific treaty to resolve art
claims is necessary because the specific practice does not rise to
the level of custom.
That is, the general obligation of cultural restitution as a
customary legal principle renders support for the restitution of
Jewish victims and their families. Custom falls short, however,
because this situation is specific and requires a deliberate response. Treaty formation is the solution because it offers a "deliberate and explicit" solution to the problem of Jewish art
claims and will resolve disputes through "prescribed
54
procedures."
152 It is true that there "are few areas of international law [that are] untouched
by the complex network of international treaty law." D'AMATO, supra note 132, at
104. The conventions listed which address cultural restitution, however, are general in scope. A treaty containing provisions that speak specifically to the return of
Nazi-looted art restitution will result in the desired behavior. That is, "[wihere
international law is crystal clear, there is no need for a treaty; but short of crystal
clarity, or where existing law is undesirable from the parties' viewpoints, a treaty
is a handy instrument for effectuating modification in the law." Id.
153 See Pell, supra note 18, at 47.
154 Chodosh, supra note 144, at 108 (citing Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late 20th Century, 17 CALIF. W. IN'L L.J. 133 (1987)). Mr. Reisman
questions the importance of custom in international law, finding that custom falls
short in addressing conflict in international relations. See id. at 142-43. Instead,
Reisman argues that "[c]ustom will not displace legislation. The world community
will legislate for itself in the last decades of the twentieth century, perhaps not
badly, but not democratically." Id. at 145. Cf D'AMATo, supra note 132, at 4 (find-
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In summary, post-war efforts at restitution ultimately
failed as a result of the political climate, and since that time,
relevant treaties have not contained provisions that effectively
resolve stolen art disputes. 155 In addition, as illustrated by the
difficulties claimants face in the context of civil lawsuits, the
restitution of artwork stolen during World War II has not become custom as a matter of practice. 1 56 An international tribunal is therefore necessary to facilitate states accepting the
57
principle that Jewish artwork should be returned.1
As the discussion in Part II.D illustrated, the principle of
cultural restitution has become firmly embedded in states' consciences since the nineteenth century. The Hague Convention
codified the nineteenth century formulations regarding the protection of cultural property and later gave rise to the ensuing
United Nations' conventions and protocols. The 1954 Convention, the 1970 Convention, and the 1995 Convention recognize
the general importance of preserving cultural property. Thus,
although there is no specific obligation binding states to practice the restitution of World War II artwork at the current time,
what exists today is a general obligation requiring states to cooperate at some level in this particular and unique area.
The political climate is conducive to establishing a treaty to
resolve Nazi-looted art claims. The Cold War, which stalled restitution efforts from the post-war period until recently, has ended and the political climate is more receptive to the concept of
rebuilding. Also, such a tribunal would likely be well received
at this time because great numbers of artwork are now resurfacing as the generation that lived through the war is diminishing that between treaty and custom, "perhaps custom is the more important, for it
is generally regarded as having universal application, whether or not any given
state participated in its formation or later 'consented' to it").
155 For example, the 1952 Convention provides generally for the recognition of
personal property rights. See discussion infra Part C. Although the 1954 Convention is more specific to the protection of cultural property, it is limited in scope,
only binding states and not private parties. See id.
156 See Anthony Paul Kearns, The Right to Food Exists Via CustomaryInternational Law, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 223, 246 (1998).
157 See Scott, supra note 129, at 113 (arguing that some treaties may generate
"instant custom"). But see Wilske, supra note 131, at 241 (maintaining that international conventions and customary law are different sources of international
law).
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ing and artwork is being divested from their estates. 1 58
National courts have been increasingly challenged by an influx
of claims and would likely welcome an international solution. 159
Furthermore, other efforts at retrieving property lost during World War II have ended in relative success in recent times.
For example, survivors or victims' families have successfully recovered such assets as money deposited in Swiss bank accounts, 1 60 insurance policy premiums, 16 1 slave labor
compensation, 1 6 2 and money procured by several German and
16 3
Austrian banks as a result of Nazi looting.
Finally, the atmosphere in the world community may be
more receptive to such a tribunal.164 Cases where other Jewish
assets have been recovered illustrate a readiness on behalf of
the courts and disputing parties to compensate survivors or victims' families, especially considering that a number of these disputes have resulted in an actual settlement of the claim. Even
Germany, "aware of her guilt[,] . . .is looking for a means to
balance the disparity [between different states' physical posses165
sion of cultural property] and convey her goodwill."
IV.

OBLIGATION TO NEGOTIATE

At the least, this Author argues that states have an obligation to negotiate the creation of an international solution for the
158 See Pell, supra note 18, at 46.

159 In the United States, over fifty civil lawsuits have been filed in federal and
state courts and the number of filings is increasing steadily. See Michael J.
Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601, 604 (1999).
160 See id. Litigation against the Swiss banks resulted in a settlement of $1.25

billion, "the largest settlement of a human rights case in United States history."
Id. at 608.

161 See id. at 609-11. Settlement negotiations will most likely result in the establishment of a fund to pay off claimants. See id. at 611.
162 See id. at 612-20. The German government decided to fund compensation
for wartime slave laborers in 1998. Estimates set the fund amount at over $1.7
billion. See Bazyler, supra note 159, at 614.
163 See id. at 620-23. Several banks settled in March of 1999 for between $30

and $40 million. See id. at 623.
164 In certain cases, and the Author argues in this case, "law owes its declarative quality to insufficient time for its internalization." Chodosh, supra note 144, at
95. Declarative rules, Mr. Chodosh argues, are "those that are declared by law by
a majority of states but not actually enforced by them, or rules that are both prac-

ticed and accepted as law, but only by a minority of states." Id. at 89.
165 Wolfgang Eichwede, Models of Restitution (Germany, Russia, Ukraine), in
THE SPOILS OF WAR,supra, note 6, at 216..

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/6

24

20001

TIME FOR A CHANGE?

return of Nazi-looted art. Although there is no duty for states to
negotiate, "[an obligation to negotiate on the part of states can
arise from commitments made in international agreements to
166
which they are parties."
For example, in North Sea ContinentalShelf, the ICJ determined that the states had an obligation to negotiate the dispute
(and reach an ultimate agreement) pursuant to customary international law. 167 In support of its holding, the ICJ derived
this obligation from a proclamation and a treaty. Not only were
the states under an obligation to negotiate, but the ICJ imposed
a duty on the parties to negotiate in a meaningful manner:
[The parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations
with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go
through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition
for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation
in the absence of agreement; they are under an obligation to conduct themselves so that the negotiations are meaningful, which
will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it ... 168
The treaties discussed in Part II.D, it can be argued, present evidence of customary international law that provides the
basis for states to enter into meaningful negotiations to reach
an international solution for the return of Nazi-looted art to its
rightful owners. In addition to the treaties in existence, recent
developments in this area include the Washington Conference.
At the Conference, states reached an agreement on general
principles of restitution for Nazi-looted art claimants. 169 This
development suggests that states are ripe to enter an international treaty because once parties engage in successful international negotiations, there is a greater likelihood of the
"conclusion of a legally binding international agreement or
treaty."'7 0

166 Martin A. Rogoff, The Obligation to Negotiate in InternationalLaw: Rules
and Realities, 16 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 141, 161 (1994).
167 See id. at 157 (discussing North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 150).
168 Id. at 157 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 150, at 25-26).
169 See Pell, supra note 18.

170 See Rogoff, supra note 166, at 143.
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RECOMMENDATION

As the ownership claims over Nazi-looted art greatly increase, so mounts the criticism of the legal mechanisms currently addressing this situation. 17 1 National solutions are
inadequate; an international solution is paramount precisely
because the stolen artwork has crossed numerous boundaries,
further complicating claim disputes. 172 The creation of a tribunal specific to cultural restitution arising out of Nazi looting is a
step in the right direction.
Although legal principles regarding this specific form of
cultural restitution have not become recognized as customary
international law, a treaty (the "Treaty") 73 setting forth carefully tailored provisions for a tribunal to definitively resolve disputes will likely facilitate an international acceptance for the
return of Jewish artwork. The likelihood of states making reparations to Jewish claimants would greatly increase.1 74 That is,
as between custom and treaty as sources of international legal
principles, "the latter is . . . increasingly significant as states
find it in their self-interest to make explicit agreements with
other states for their mutual benefit and to avoid future conflicts." 75 With any hope, states will recognize the Treaty, abide
by its terms, and the indoctrination of the principle of cultural
171 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2; see also Lau-Lavie, supra note 2, at 587.
172 See Stephanie Cuba, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of
Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 48789 (1999). One noteworthy national effort, however, is the United States Congress'
enactment of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act ("HVRA") which calls for a return
of possessions, looted by the Nazis, to their rightful owners. See Holocaust Victims
Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15 (1998).
173 See Cuba, supra note 172, at 447. The author recognizes the work of Owen
Pell in this regard, specifically Mr. Pell's suggestions regarding the creation of a
special tribunal to resolve Nazi looted art claims. Many of this Author's ideas regarding the specifics of the Treaty, Tribunal, and Register are derived from Mr.
Pell's work. See generally Pell, supra note 18.
174 [A] necessary ingredient of change is the articulation of the practice as
an issue of international law. Simple repetition is insufficient; all matters
of comity do not eventually 'harden' into customary law. Repetition, no
matter how frequent, cannot transform tourism or the use of French as a
primary language in diplomacy into legally binding obligations.
D'AMArO, supra note 132, at 78. But see Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)
(introducing the concept of practice based on comity evolving into customary law).
175 See D'AMATO, supra note 132, at 4.
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restitution for World War II survivors or victims' families into
international law will follow.
The Treaty would provide for the establishment of a tribunal (the "Tribunal") to decide claim disputes. As opposed to pursuing a claim in a civil lawsuit, the Tribunal would be
specialized, and therefore more efficient than general courts,
thereby reducing parties' costs. Moreover, the Tribunal's decision would be binding, and would present a unified and certain
outcome because the Tribunal would apply consistent legal
principles.
Perhaps the most important provision of the Treaty would
be the statute of limitations provision. As illustrated by the
previous discussion regarding claims brought in the United
States, courts have struggled over this concept. The basic policy
goals behind any statute of limitations, however, is to "bar stale
claims" which "present evidentiary problems: witnesses die,
memories fade, and evidence is lost. " 176 For several reasons,
the demand and refusal rule, as discussed in Guggenheim, as
opposed to the due diligence rule, as discussed in O'Keeffe, is the
equitable choice for Nazi-looted art claims. First, the evidence
supporting these claims is just beginning to surface. 17 7 Second,
individuals have only recently gained access to government
records that provide insight into an artwork's provenance.1 7T
Applying the due diligence standard would be unduly harsh
to survivors or victims' families. The due diligence standard
would not realize the statute of limitations' policy goal of limiting stale claims; rather, it would bar valid claims. Because government records contain a substantial amount of the
information necessary to pursue a Nazi-looted art claim, "a statute of limitations could arbitrarily foreclose a plaintiffs claim
79
which is not truly stale."
Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals correctly reasoned in Guggenheim that the due diligence standard falls short
in that it fails to take into consideration a number of factors
that overburden a true owner.' 8 0 For example, survivors or vicSee Cuba, supra note 172, at 461.
See id.
178 See id.
179 Id. at 462.
180 See discussion supra Part C.
176
177
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tims' families may have been prohibited from searching for
their lost artwork precisely because they did not have access to
informative documents. Also, parties, like the Guggenheim,
may have valid reasons for foregoing a search for their lost artwork. In light of these circumstances, the burden should not
fall on survivors or victims' families. They bear enough of a
burden without having to meet the due diligence
requirement. 181
Next, because "there is currently no reasonable means
available to a purchaser to ascertain the provenance of a painting,"' 8 2 an integral part of the Treaty would be the establishment of an official registry (the "Registry"). The Registry would
contain information about an artwork's provenance, a physical
description of the artwork, and any decisions made by the Tribunal regarding the work of art. Instead of having to research a
number of databases, a central registry specifically containing
information about Nazi-looted art would offer parties a definitive research tool for researching the provenance of an artwork.
In addition, such a registry would provide a new purchaser of
artwork with information verifying certainty to title. Above all,
an official registry would provide uniform and accurate information, thereby reducing uncertainties in the art world.
As discussed in Part II.D, there is a general obligation
placed on states to provide cultural restitution. This obligation
extends to states an obligation to, at the least, negotiate a
treaty similar to the one described above. The reason this general obligation has not resulted in an international solution for
Nazi-looted art restitution is best explained by the complicated
details that courts and claimants face in attempting to resolve
claims. That is, the principle exists, but the details have complicated the natural development of an international solution.
Most significantly, other principles of law existing at the
state level, such as the statute of limitations issue, have
stymied the development of the general obligation into a specific
solution at the international level. The Treaty would resolve
the conflict among courts regarding the statute of limitations
placed on suits and create a specific obligation for states to re181 See Cuba, supra note 172, at 460.
182 O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 498 (1980).
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solve conflict regarding Nazi-looted art in a uniform and predictable manner.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It has been over fifty years since the downfall of Hitler and
the Nazi regime. Yet, Jewish families still seek the return of
their stolen artwork. With the Cold War subsided, and states'
consciences raised regarding World War II reparations, it is
time for artwork to be restored to its original owners. An international treaty establishing a tribunal is the most effective solution to resolve Nazi-looted art claim disputes. Through the
Tribunal, families may finally lay to rest their desires to collect
their ancestors' treasured works of art and thereby gain a sense
of closure.
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